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**GOP will give into *political pressure* but it’ll be a fight**

**Sargent 10-30**-13 GREG SARGENT . Washington Post “Immigration reform is definitely undead” [http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/10/30/immigration-reform-is-definitely-undead/] **[MG]**

We now have three House Republicans who have signed on to the House Dem comprehensive immigration reform bill, putting immigration reform officially back in the “undead” category. GOP Rep. David **Valada**o of California is officially on board with the bipartisan proposal, according to a statement from the Congressman sent my way: “I have been working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to find common ground on the issue of immigration reform. Recently, I have focused my efforts on joining with likeminded Republicans in organizing and demonstrating to Republican Leadership broad support within the Party to address immigration reform in the House by the end of the year. “By supporting H.R. 15 I am strengthening my message: Addressing immigration reform in the House cannot wait. I am serious about making real progress and will remain committed to doing whatever it takes to repair our broken immigration system.” Valadao’s move is not wholly unexpected, given that he inhabits a moderate district with a lot of Latinos. But his insistence that addressing immigration reform “cannot wait” is helpful. It seems like an implicit message to the GOP leadership: We must act this year, and on this bill, if necessary. This comes after GOP Reps. leana Ros-Lehtinen and Jeff Denham did the same. Denham has said he expects “more” Republicans to ultimately sign on, and has also said that the House GOP leadership told him there will be a vote on something immigration-related by the end of the year. It’s unclear whether there will actually be a House vote on anything involving immigration before the year runs out, and it seems very unlikely that there will be a vote on the House Dem measure, which is essentially the Senate comprehensive immigration reform bill, without the Corker-Hoeven border security amendment that House Dems dislike, and instead with another border security amendment House Dems like swapped in. However, the movement among Republicans towards the Dem bill — even if it is only a trickle for now — is interesting, as a reminder that immigration reform can happen if House GOP leaders actually want it to. To be sure, immigration reform faces a huge obstacle: The stark underlying structural realities of the House Republican caucus. Far too few Republican members have large enough Latino populations to impact the outcome in 2014. With primaries coming, there just may be no incentive for Republicans to act until after the 2014 elections. But there are other factors to consider. In some key respects, immigration reform poses its own unique set of political challenges and conditions — **it is not quite as polarizing an issue** as, say, Obamacare or even the question of whether to agree to new revenues as part of a budget deal. Major GOP aligned constituencies — the **U.S. Chamber of Commerce**, **evangelicals,** **high tech and agricultural interests** in the districts of House Republicans – want immigration reform. What’s more, there is a built-in incentive for Republicans to put this issue behind them, given the slow forward march of demographic realities. Also, as longtime immigration operative Simon Rosenberg explains, Congressional Republicans have a long history of working on this issue. And some polls show that even sizable chunks of Republican voters want comprehensive reform, particularly if it is packaged with border security (Republican pollster Whit Ayres’ research, in particular, has shown that even GOP primary voters want action when informed that the other option is the status quo or “de facto amnesty,” as some pro-reform Republicans put it. Indeed, if there is anything that can make something happen, it’s the possibility that inaction is far more difficult politically for Republicans than many of them (and many commentators) claim. The immigration problem — “de facto amnesty” is not going away. If more Republicans like these three urge action inside the GOP caucus, it’s not impossible that House GOP leaders will allow votes on border security, the Kids Act, or potentially the legalization proposal that Republicans are said to be working on. That could possibly get us to conference. Yes, **immigration reform remains decidedly undead.**

**Drains capital – Backlash and hostage taking on unrelated priority legislation is empirically proven, likely in future and specifically true for Rubio**

**LeoGrande, 12**

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a **major role** in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the **price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill** to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was **stymied by indifference or resistance** elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to **avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger.** When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team **delayed the announcement for several months** at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration **surrendered to** Senator **Rubio's demand** that it limit the licensing of travel providers **in exchange** for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to **sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives**, both Democrat and Republican, who are **willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba**. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a **strong incentive to try the same tactic again**. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been **thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners**. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the **bruising battle** with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that **require a significant expenditure of political capital** rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

**PC Is Key to Getting the *Essential Parts* of the Bill Through**

Anderson **Robichaud October 25**, 2013. n behalf of Robichaud, Anderson & Alcantara P.A. posted in US Immigration Law on “Beyond The Poisoned Well” http://www.robichaudlaw.com/blog/2013/10/beyond-the-poisoned-well-immigration-reform-tactics-changing.shtml

President Obama has not given up on enacting **c**omprehensive **i**mmigration **r**eform. ¶ To be sure, there is concern in Washington, DC and around the country that the partisan wrangling over the partial federal government shutdown "poisoned the well" of good will that may be needed to get the president and both chambers of Congress to agree on a specific proposal.¶ That is one reason why it may be necessary to break up the proposal passed by the Senate earlier this year into several different smaller bills. The smaller bills could tackle specific issues such as work visas or family immigration.¶ This week, there were indications that President Obama may be coming around to that point of view.¶ After the Senate passed a comprehensive immigration bill in June, the hope was that the U.S. House of Representatives would take up that bill. But the House did not do so. And now, after the passage of several months and the reality-check of the shutdown, the president appears to be shifting his tactics.¶ President Obama said this week that he is open to proposals from Republicans about possibly dividing up an immigration overhaul into several separate parts.¶ In political terms, it may be more practical to pass one or more of those parts than to keep holding out for a comprehensive reform that addresses all of the issues, all at once.¶ Of course, **in either form** -- either comprehensive or broken into separate parts -- **it will take considerable political capita**l and probably some (often elusive) compromise to actually pass immigration reform. But President **Obama is clearly** still **committed to making such reform one of the top priorities** of his second term.

**And, comprehensive immigration reform is critical to unions**

**Sarlin 13**(Benjy Sarlin, 2013, Talking Points Memo, January 14, 2013, <http://bit.ly/YtDOzS>)

Eliseo Medina, secretary treasurer of the Service Employees International Union and labor’s point man on immigration, has been waiting decades for a moment like this one. “I think we get it this year,” a smiling Medina told TPM in his office in Washington. “And if we don’t, the discussion won’t be about whether it’s coming afterwards, just what it will look like and when.” Over his long career, Medina’s witnessed dozens of promising immigration reform efforts, only to see them countered just as often by a restrictionist backlashes — backlashes that sometimes included support from unions. But everything seems to be coming together at the right time in 2013, with a broad coalition of labor, business, religious leaders, Latino groups, and even some prominent Republicans demanding immediate action. With victory in sight, SEIU is committing the full force of its 2.1 million members to pushing comprehensive reform in 2013, with plans for rallies around the country, education campaigns for members, and an inside game aimed at lobbying lawmakers in Washington towards a final vote. The AFL-CIO, the nation’s largest federation of unions, is on board as well; and the two sometimes rival groups are united around a common set of policy principles after splitting on President George W. Bush’s failed immigration effort. Both organizations identify passing a bill that includes a path to citizenship for the undocumented population as one of their absolute top priorities for the 113th Congress. “The inequality created by our current immigration system is having a deeper effect on our society then anything we’ve seen in recent history,” Ana Avendaño, director of the AFL-CIO’s director of immigration and community action, told TPM. “We have 11.5 million people who really are not benefitting from the hard fought gains that the labor movement and other social movements have accomplished in this country.” **For labor, the debate may be more than just a policy question, but an existential one**. Union membership has cratered in recent decades for reasons ranging from the collapse of the manufacturing sector to improved tactics by business to discourage workers from organizing. To reverse this trend, labor bet big in 2008 on card check legislation that would make it easier to form a union, but that bill languished in Congress — even with 60 Democratic senators. Outside of Washington, things only grew more dire as Republican governors enacted right to work legislation and looked to limit collective bargaining rights in states like Michigan and Wisconsin. Under pressure from all sides, immigration reform may be labor’s last, best chance at major legislative gains under Obama. Leaders are counting on a comprehensive reform bill to **boost living standards** for low-wage workers currently vulnerable to exploitation, **spur recruitment** in growing industries, **and bank goodwill** with both union members and the public at large.

**And, strong unions are key to check devaluation of life and annihilates society**

**Munck 10,**theme leader for institutionalisation, interculturalism and development at Dublin City University in Ireland and visiting Professor of Sociology at the University of Liverpool [Ronaldo, “Globalisation, labour and development: a view from the South,” Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa Number 72/73, 2010, project muse]

Polanyi goes further than Marx to argue that 'labour power' is but an 'alleged commodity' precisely because it 'cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused without affecting also the human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity' (Polanyi 2001:76). This is more than a moral critique of capitalism, however, because Polanyi goes on to argue that **trade unions**, for example, should be quite clear that their **purpose is precisely 'that of** interfering with the laws of supply and demand **in respect of human labour**, and **removing it from the orbit of the market'** (Polanyi 2001:186). **Any** move from within society to remove any element from the market (**'decommodification') thus challenges the market economy in its fundamentals.**The self-regulation orself-adjusting market was, for Polanyi, a 'stark-utopia' in the sense that it could not be achieved: 'Such an institution **could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society**; **it would have physically destroyed** **[hu]man** **[ity]** **and transformed** **his** **[or her] surroundings into a wilderness'** (Polanyi 2001:3). In modern terminology, the self-regulating market was **neither socially nor environmentally sustainable**. Neo-liberals today have developed a similarly fundamentalist discourse based on the 'magic of the market'. Central to this identity is the notion that government interference in economic affairs must be reversed and that the individual market agent or 'entrepreneur' should be given a free hand. In this grand schema society does not exist and nature is seen simply [End Page 211] as a factor of production. This market system and the associated laissez-faire ideology 'created the delusion of economic determinism' (Polanyi 1947:143).

**Comprehensive immigration reform is key to solve structural and violence against immigrant communities and turns all of their impacts**

Banuelas 10 (Arturo, "The lies are killing us: The need for immigration reform," US Catholic, October,www.uscatholic.org/culture/social-justice/2010/10/lies-are-killing-us-need-immigration-reform)

Immigrants like Marisol show us that immigration reform is more than simply a matter of human rights for undocumented immigrants. **It is a matter of survival for the poorest**. No child of God should ever have to leave her family at 5 years of age to be able to eat and survive in our world. Like the majority of people who cross the border, these are not terrorists or drug smugglers but our brothers and sisters.¶ The growing anti-immigrant sentiment in our country since 9/11 did not happen because people suddenly wanted to become cruel and heartless. It began because people started believing a lie about who we Latinos are, both documented and undocumented.¶ This is why immigration is a defining issue that is about us—all of us Latinos—and about how we will shape the future of our church and our country. There is a saying in Spanish, "La mentira nos trae la muerte." Lies bring death.¶ The lie is that immigrants, and by association all of us Latinos, **are disposable as human beings** **and not worthy of human dignity and respect**. And this lie is killing us.¶ An immigrant recently told me, "I've been sacrificing myself for my family, but in this country I am worth nothing." Latinos and immigrants encounter racism, resentment, and extreme hostilities against them, and they masquerade as patriotism and now also as national security.¶ By now we are familiar with the countless problems immigrants endure as a result of this lie: an increase in border deaths to more than 400 a year; raids, arrests, and deportations separating families; a backlog in family reunification and visa requests; militarization of the border; sexual exploitation of women immigrants traveling north; abuses in detention centers.¶ Arizona has recently made national headlines for passing harsh anti-immigrant laws, but today more than 20 states have introduced even harsher laws than Arizona. The solutions these laws propose perpetuate lies, persecute innocent people, expose all of us Latinos to racial profiling, and cause death and suffering to the poor. Those who say that they are not against immigrants yet support such oppressive laws are practicing backdoor racism at its worst.¶ Sure, every nation has a right to protect its borders against impending threats, but immigrants working to feed their children are not a threat to anyone. Their presence is not a threat, it is a human right; and we support their right to a better life.¶ Many today scapegoat the poor for self-serving political gain, for economic greed, and security fears. Their lies blind people from seeing Christ in others and keep them from hearing the gospel call to hospitality of the stranger among us. These lies are being used to justify injustice and foster racism that causes pervasive exploitation of immigrants, who are demonized as illegal, as alien, as suspicious human beings.¶ Since the majority of the more than 90 nationalities that daily cross our borders are from the Americas, it is our Latinidad itself that is being attacked. We know that the root causes of immigration include extreme poverty, unemployment, political and military corruption, and government instability in the countries of origin. However, we Latinos and Latinas throughout the Americas also know that the United States shares in the responsibility for these conditions that drive immigrants north across our borders.¶ It is not a secret that once the estimated 12 to 20 million currently undocumented immigrants become citizens, our country will be different. This process has already begun, but wait until we get to vote, buy homes, graduate from universities, and become elected officials.¶ Es mentira, it is a lie that immigrants will not learn English. In our parish we have some 100 people learning English to become citizens, and similar programs exist all over.¶ Es mentira that all immigrants are here illegally. The truth is that the majority are here on some type of visa.¶ Es mentira that stronger enforcement along the U.S.-Mexico border will stop immigrants from crossing the border. It is jobs that bring immigrants to the United States.¶ Es mentira that immigrants are draining our health care and educational systems. The fact is that immigrants contribute about $90 billion in taxes, much more than the $5 billion they use in services.¶ Despite these lies I feel optimistic because this is our time, this is Latino time. We are coming of age, and we want to help fashion a new nation: one that is more just, equal, and free for all citizens, especially the poorest.¶ But we will need to do this the Latino way, grounded in a new vision we inherited from our indigenous ancestors, who said, "Tu eres mi otro yo," you are my other self. This is a profound spiritual vision of life, an economic program for justice, a cultural solution for peace, and an authentic reform for human dignity.¶ Tu eres mi otro yo is the Latino way. We are all linked as one. We stand together, or we fall together. We are each other, and we need to help each other. Our ancestors teach us: If I despise you, I despise myself. And if I promote the good in you, I promote the goodness in me and everyone else.¶ Our fathers, mothers, and abuelos have always taught what Christ teaches us: that we were made good and for good. When we see life from this decidedly Latino worldview, we discover that there are more good people in the world than bad, that the world is in truth moving toward this oneness. This is the Latino good news.¶ I believe that **our greatest meaning in life** comes from our solidarity with others, especially the struggling poorest among us. As long as they do not eat, have health care, get a good education, live in decent housing, get treated with respect and dignity, then we all remain incomplete in ourselves and as a nation.¶ In a time of such propaganda, lies, drastic poverty, violence, racism, and war, in this time when human life seems so dirt cheap, we must proclaim that each person matters, that they matter enormously to us because tu eres mi otro yo.¶ As a Latino from the border I have reason to feel optimistic about life and our future because in us we carry this deep Latino desire to live out our God-given oneness; at the end of all our human struggles, we will see that it is our oneness that will win over lies, divisions, hate, and racism. In the end the glory will go to those who know how to embrace tu eres mi otro yo. In the end victory comes in our togetherness.¶ I look at our Latino history in terms of the biblical story of the Exodus: Some have crossed the sea into the Promised Land of no more borders. Others are still in the water trying to make it to land. And some arrived late and are still wandering in the desert. Moses told them to be at the edge of the sea by 10 a.m., but, being Latino, they arrived at noon. They are still out there dreaming and wondering what it will be like when they get to the other side. Some of them are dying without water, acceptance, lack of health care, food, or shelter.¶ But today we say, "Come, venganse," we are with you because our ministries represent solidarity in the struggle for human rights for all people.¶ **The divisive border wall exists also in our hearts**. When the border fence went up, I was part of a march protesting it. I remember walking up to the ugly steel barrier. I put my fingers through the fence, and I felt deep anger. I wanted to tear it down with my bare hands.¶ I kept remembering the Raramuri children in our parish missions in Mexico's northern Sierra Tarahumara, who do not have enough to eat, whose fathers and brothers search for ways to feed their families. Holding the fence I remembered their empty stomachs. I could hear Ester ask her mother, "Are we going to eat today?"¶ Holding the fence in my hands, I said a prayer. I asked Jesus to forgive us. And I asked la Virgen de Guadalupe to protect her children. What the fence says is: "I don't want you to be my other self."¶ Those of us who live on the border question whether the racial make-up of our families has anything to do with the fact that Canada and the Atlantic and Pacific coasts do not have disgusting walls, yet their combined border miles far exceed our 2,000-mile-long southwest border.¶ This immoral wall along our border and in our nation's heart is causing moral damage to the nation's soul with long-term consequences far beyond the fears we have of terrorists. It says that we have stopped dreaming of the possibilities to help each other as human beings in the land of the free. It says that we have given in to smallness of our hearts because of the fear-filled lies that claim doom when we welcome the strangers in our midst.¶ This ugly $242 billion wall is a wake-up call that our national leadership has failed to help us and that it is time for us to offer a better vision for national problems. We need to stop the further construction of this wall, tear it down, and make good use of the materials. **What we need instead is just, comprehensive immigration reform,** which will help America become a decent nation.¶ This is an historic moment for us. We have never been this close to immigration reform, and we are not backing down because we are not afraid of those who oppose us. I have seen in the faces of Latinos all over the country that we are ready to show our resolve, our conviction, and our dedication to the immigrants and to reform. We want to do what it takes because we deeply believe that justice will triumph over hate, that love will conquer racism, and that common compassion will overcome the lies.

### 1nc – t-increase

**Interpretation – Economic engagement is direct investment – not removal of RESTRICTIONS**

**Haass, 2K** – Brookings Foreign Policy Studies director

[Richard, and Meghan O'Sullivan, "Introduction" in Honey and Vinegar, ed. by Haass and O'Sullivan, google books]

Architects of engagement strategies have a **wide variety** of incentives from which to choose. Economic engagement might offer **tangible incentives** such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans, and economic aid." Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the institutions that govem it rank among the most potent incentives in today's global market."

**Violation – the aff only gets rid of something that PREVENTS engagement, but doesn’t directly INCREASE engagement**

**That’s a voting issue**

**They explode the topic – every possible restrictions suddenly becomes a viable aff**

**And they wreck neg ground – they can get claim advantages off getting rid of restrictions, but not defend INVESTMENT**

### 1nc – schmitt

**The ethical endorsement of the 1AC establishes a new order for humanity. Their methodology shapes a world that requires the production of a violent other and the extermination of that other. Instead of an inclusive or utopian society, the affirmative will justify wars of annihilation in the name of difference.**

**Odysseos 08,** Dr. Louiza Odysseos, University of Sussex Department of International Relations, “Against Ethics? Iconographies of Enmity and Acts of Obligation in Carl Schmitt’s Theory of the Partisan,” Practices of Ethics: Relating/Responding to Difference in International Politics Annual Convention, International Studies Association, 2008

In The Concept of the Political Schmitt had already indicted the increased usage of the terminology of ‘humanity’ by both theorists and institutional actors such as the League of Nations (1996a). His initial critique allows us to illuminate four distinct criticisms against contemporary world politics’ ethical recourse to the discourse of humanity (cf. Odysseos 2007b). The first objection arises from the location of this discourse in the liberal universe of values. By using the discourse of humanity, the project of a universal ethics reverberates with the nineteenth century ‘ringing proclamations of disinterested liberal principle’ (Gowan 2003: 53) through which ‘liberalism quite successfully conceals its politics, which is the politics of getting rid of politics’ (Dyzenhaus 1998: 14). For Schmitt, the focus of liberal modernity on moral questions aims to ignore or surpass questions of conflict altogether: it is therefore ‘the battle against the political - as Schmitt defines the political’, in terms of the permanency of social antagonism in politics (Sax 2002: 501). The second criticism argues that ‘humanity is not a political concept, and no political entity corresponds to it. The eighteenth century humanitarian concept of humanity was a polemical denial of the then existing aristocratic feudal system and the privileges accompanying it’ (Schmitt 1996a: 55). Outside of this historical location, where does it find concrete expression but in the politics of a politically neutral ‘international community’ which acts, we are assured, in the interest of humanity? (cf. Blair 1999). The ‘international community is coextensive with humanity…[it]possesses the inherent right to impose its will…and to punish its violation, not because of a treaty, or a pact or a covenant, but because of an international need’, a need which it can only determine as the ‘secularized “church” of “common humanity”’ (Rasch 2003: 137, citing James Brown Scott).2 A third objection, still, has to do with the imposition of particular kind of monism: despite the lip-service to plurality, taken from the market (Kalyvas 1999), ‘liberal pluralism is in fact not in the least pluralist but reveals itself to be an overriding monism, the monism of humanity’ (Rasch 2003: 136). Similarly, current universalist perspectives, while praising ‘customary’ or cultural differences, think of them ‘but asethical or aesthetic material for a unified polychromatic culture – a new singularity born of a blending and merging of multiple local constituents’ (Brennan 2003: 41).One oft-discussed disciplining effect is that, politically, the ethics of a universal humanity shows little tolerance for what is regarded as ‘intolerant’ politics, which is any politics that moves in opposition to its ideals, rendering political opposition to it illegitimate (Rasch 2003: 136). This is compounded by the fact that liberal ethical discourses are also defined by a claim to their own exception and superiority. They naturalise the historical origins of liberal societies, which are no longer regarded as ‘contingently established and historically conditioned forms of organization’; rather, they ‘become the universal standard against which other societies are judged. Those found wanting are banished, as outlaws, from the civilized world. Ironically, one of the signs of their outlaw status is their insistence on autonomy, on sovereignty’ (ibid.:141; cf. Donnelly 1998). Most importantly, and related to this concern, there is the relation of the concept of humanity to ‘the other’, and to war and violence. In its historical location, the humanity concept had critical purchase against aristocratic prerogatives; yet its utilisation by liberal ethical discourses within a philosophy of an ‘absolute humanity’, Schmitt feared, could bring about new and unimaginable modes of exclusion (1996a,2003,2004/2007): By virtue of its universality and abstract normativity, it has no localizable polis, no clear distinction between what is inside and what is outside. Does humanity embrace all humans? Are there no gates to the city and thus no barbarians outside? If not, against whom or what does it wage its wars? (Rasch2003: 135). ‘Humanity as such’, Schmitt noted, ‘cannot wage war because it has no enemy’,(1996a: 54), indicating that humanity ‘is a polemical word that negates its opposite’ (Kennedy 1998: 94; emphasis added). In The Concept of the Political Schmitt argued that humanity ‘excludes the concept of the enemy, because the enemy does not cease to be a human being’ (1996a: 54). However, in his 1950 book with an international focus, The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt noted how only when ‘man appeared to be the embodiment of absolute humanity, did the other side of this concept appear in the form of a new enemy: the inhuman’ (2003a: 104). It becomes apparent that, historically examined, the concept of humanity engenders a return to a ‘discriminatory concept of war’, by which Schmitt meant that it reintroduces the legitimacy and need for substantive causes of justice in war (Schmitt 2003b: 37-52). This in turn disallows the notion of justus hostis, of a ‘just enemy’ – explored in section three – associated with the notion of non-discriminatory interstate war which took the shape of guerreen for me (Schmitt 2003a: 142-144). The concept of humanity, therefore, shatters the formal concept of justus hostis, allowing the enemy to now be designated substantively as an enemy of humanity as such. This leaves the enemy of humanity with no value and open to dehumanisation and political and physical annihilation (Schmitt 2004: 67). In discussing the League of Nations, Schmitt highlights that, compared to the kinds of wars that can be waged on behalf of humanity, the interstate European wars from 1815 to 1914 in reality were regulated; they were bracketed by the neutral Great Powers and were completely legal procedures in comparison with the modern and gratuitous police actions against violators of peace, which can be dreadful acts of annihilation (Schmitt2003a: 186). Enemies of humanity cannot be considered ‘just and equal’. Moreover, they cannot claim neutrality: one cannot remain neutral in the call to be for or against humanity or its freedom; one cannot, similarly, claim a right to resist or defend oneself, in the sense we understand this right to have existed in the international law of Europe (the jus publicum Europeaum). Such a denial of self-defence and resistance ‘can presage a dreadful nihilistic destruction of all law’ (ibid.: 187). When the enemy is not accorded a procedural justice and formal equality, the notion that peace can be made with him is unacceptable, as Schmitt detailed through his study of the League of Nations, which had declared the abolition of war, but in rescinding the concept of neutrality only succeeded in the ‘dissolution of “peace”’ (ibid.: 246). It is with the dissolution of peace that total wars of annihilation become possible, where ‘the other’ cannot be assimilated, or accommodated, let alone tolerated: the friend/enemy distinction is not longer taking place with a justus hostis but rather between good and evil, human and in human, where ‘the negative pole of the distinction is to be fully and finally consumed without remainder’ (Rasch 2003: 137). Finally, the ethical discourse of a universal humanity can be discerned in the tendency to normalise diverse peoples through legalisation and individualisation. The paramount emphasis placed on legal instruments and entitlements such as human rights transforms diverse subjectivities into ‘rights-holders’. ‘[T]he other is stripped of his otherness and made to conform to the universal ideal of what it means to be human’, meaning that ‘the term “human” is not descriptive, but evaluative. To be truly human, one needs to be corrected’ (Rasch 2003: 140 and 137; cf. Young 2002;Hopgood 2000). What does this correction in its ‘multiform tactics’, which include Michel Foucault’s proper terms of discipline and training, aim to produce? The answer may well be the proper, free (masterful), equal and rational (in its self-interest)subject of rights, of capitalism and the governmentalised state (Foucault 2001a). As Gil Anidjar notes, the operation of the traditional binary ‘sovereign/enemy’ is transformed ‘in the disciplinary society (which signals, according to Foucault, the dissolution of sovereign power) into “disciplinary regime/criminality” (or, for that second term, legal subject, subject of the law, and, of course, “man”)’ (Anidjar 2004:42; emphasis added). Of equally great importance is transformation that follows in the transition from a disciplinary to a governmental economy of power: this is what we are at the moment confronting and must analyse: what are the paths towards which the other as enemy is directed by (a global) governmentality and, moreover, what forms, subjectivities, etc., is the ‘enemy’ encouraged to take in the form of an unavoidable freedom, along the lines articulated by Foucault under the heading of ‘self government’(2007b).

**Alternative: Only rejecting the ethics of obligation prevents the annihilation of difference and unending violence. We should embrace the space of the political through the endorsement of enmity.**

**Our obligation lies in the openness of the political order. Liberalized politics is too limited in scope and ignores the pluriversal nature of the political. That’s critical to real inclusion.**

**Odysseos 08**, Dr. Louiza Odysseos, University of Sussex Department of International Relations, “Against Ethics? Iconographies of Enmity and Acts of Obligation in Carl Schmitt’s Theory of the Partisan,” Practices of Ethics: Relating/Responding to Difference in International Politics Annual Convention, International Studies Association, 2008

The paper ends with a discussion of obligation. Outlining the contours of a notion of political, rather, than ethical obligation, however, may require some explicit distancing from the now-familiar accounts that have oriented critical ‘ethical’ endeavours for some time. So we ask again the ethical question which has haunted us: from whence does obligation originate? Were we to be still enthralled by a Levinasian or generally any ‘other-beholden’ thought of being ‘hostage’ to the other, we might say that the face to face encounter installs obligation before representation, knowledge and other ‘Greek’ relationalities (Levinas 1989: 76–77; Odysseos 2007a: 132-151).Caputo, however, warns us off this kind of commitment to a notion of perfectible or total obligation. He asks that we recognise that ‘one is always inside/outside obligation, on its margins. On the threshold of foolishness. Almost a perfect fool for the Other. But not quite; nothing is perfect’ (1993: 126). The laudable but impossible perfectibility of ethics and ethical obligation to the other must be rethought. This is because ‘one is hostage of the Other, but one also keeps an army, just in case’ (ibid.).Caputo is not speaking as a political realist in this apparently funny comment. He is pointing, I suggest, to the centrality of politics and enmity. Obligation is not to the other alone; it is also to the radical possibility of openness of political order, which allows self and other to be ‘determined otherwise’ (Prozorov 2007a). Analytically, we also want to know the tactics and subjective effects of being directed towards enforced freedom. In this way, we might articulate a political and concrete act obligation that is inextricably tied to freedom that is not ‘enforced’, that is not produced for us, or as ‘us’.nWith Schmitt, one might say that obligation points practically (i.e. politically) to the ‘relativisation of enmity’. Obligation may not, however, be towards the enemy as such, for the enemy is the pulse of the political – so long as the enemy is relative (yet can be killed) in the order, the openness of the order can be vouched safe in the disruption of the absolutism of its immanence (Ojakangas 2007; Schmitt 1995a). We might, then, recast Schmitt’s conception of the political (which he regards as coming into being in the decision which distinguishes between friend and enemy) through his later emphasis in Theory of the Partisan on the politically normative significance of the relativisation of enmity. In other words, we might say that what needs to remain possible is the constant struggle ‘between constituent and constituted power’(Beasley-Murray 2005: 221) in both society and also world order. It is important to identify the ethical and governmental project of enforced freedom because doing so allows us to think of obligation as related to a different freedom: freedom as resistance (not freedom as an attribute). Prozorov suggests that an ‘ontology of concrete freedom’ relies on ‘freedom of potentiality of being other wise, of being able to ‘to assert one’s power as a living being against the power, whose paradigm consists in the “care of the living”’ (2007a: 210-211). This assumes, however, first, that resistance lies in the ‘refusal of biopolitical care that affirms the sovereign power of bare life’ ((Prozorov 2007a: 20) and, second, that there is a sort of ‘radical freedom of the human being that precedes governmental care’ (Prozorov2007a: 110). I argue in conclusion, however, that freedom as resistance is still too limited; it may still be, despite all attempts, lured back to a thinking of an essence: of that prior state of pre-governmental production of subjectivity, which in actuality does not exist. Rather, Foucault’s brief intervention on the issue of obligation (2001b) through the International Committee against Piracy points to ‘a radically interdependent relationship with practices of governmentality’ (Campbell 1998: 516) to which we are all subjected, here understood in the proper Greek sense of our subjectivity being predicated on governmental practice (cf. Odysseos 2007a: 4). ‘We are all members of the community of the governed and thereby obliged to show mutual solidarity’, Foucault had argued, as against obligation understood within modern humanism (Foucault 2001b: 474; emphasis added). This obligation which he invokes simply exists (es gibt), as Heidegger might say. We would add that Schmitt’s account of the transition from ‘real’ to ‘absolute’ enmity in the twentieth century and his demand that ‘the enemy is not something to be eliminated out of a particular reason, something to be annihilated as worthless..’ must be read in this way (Schmitt2004: 61): as speaking for the need to ward off the shutting down of politics. That is why Schmitt’s two iconographies rest precisely on two extremes: the mythic narratives of an order open to enmity as its exteriority, which guarantees pluriversal openness, on the one hand, and the absolute immanence of order where ‘absolute enmity driv[es] the political universe’ on the other hand (Goodson 2004b: 151).This is a notion of a world-political obligation that ‘is a kind of skandalon for ethics, which makes ethics blush, which it must reject or expel in order to maintain its good name…’ (Caputo 1993: 5). This obligation is articulated for the openness that enmity brings; it attends to the other as enemy by allowing, against ethics, for the continued but changeable structurations of the field of politics, of politics as pluriverse.

**The affirmatives attempt at developing a utopian and inclusive society results in crusades against the other. That results in extermination camps and biopolitical conflict.**

**Thorup 06,** Mikkel Thorup, lecturer and researcher at the Institute of Philosophy and History of Ideas at the University of Aarhus in Denmark, In Defense of Enmity – Critiques of Liberal Globalism, Ph.D. Dissertation, January 2006, <http://rudar.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/2068/1/In_defence_of_enmity_-_pdf.pdf>

Another register in which the lines are blurred or rather non-existent is in the biopolitical enmity as theorized by Michel Foucault (2003; Kelly 2004) and Giorgio Agamben (1998). Here, we most clearly see the blurring of lines. In the biopolitical enmity, the enemy is named in biological and psychological terms and the enemy is found within the social body. The line between an inside, the friends, and an outside, the enemies, is no longer meaningful. The enemy lives among us and the biopolitical state takes it upon itself to single out those, who threaten the health of the community. This concept of enmity is also highly discriminatory. It establishes a hierarchy of worthy life and starts to talk about 'life unworthy of being lived' and its annihilation (Agamben 1998: 136), most dramatically and tragically executed in the Nazi concentration and euthanasia program but for both Foucault and Agamben a constitutive element in modernity. The goal of a biopolitical war is not to reach a modus vivendi with the enemy but to eliminate him. This is a total war: ... the enemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to the population and for the population. In the biopower system, in other words, killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race. (Foucault 2003: 256, my italics) What the biopolitical enmity makes clear is the normalization of the exceptional, as the biopolitical state declares war on parts of its own population, not only in form of extermination but also quarantining of the sick, surveillance, exclusions, imprisonments, institutionalization of the abnormal etc. The heroic battles are replaced by micro-technologies that maximize the mortality of some groups and minimize it for others. Instead of individual killings, we get what Ernst Fraenkel with a very precise expression called 'civil death' (1969: 95) or what Foucualt called 'statistical death'. The sovereign does not manifest himself in splendid displays of power, public executions, but in the actions of the secret police, disappearances and extermination camps (Foucault 2003: chap. 11). The biopolitical state emerges, where racism and statism meets. It is no longer: 'We have to defend ourselves against society', but 'We have to defend society against all the biological threats posed by the other, the subrace, the counterrace that we are, despite ourselves, bringing into existence' ... we see the appearance of a State racism: a racism that society will direct against itself, against its own elements and its own products. This is the internal racism of permanent purification (Foucault 2003: 61-2)

### 1nc – shunning

**The affirmative engages with known human rights abusers-— *moral duty* to shun**

**Beversluis 89** — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict. But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions? We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a **duty** (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but **also to support that moral order**. Consider that the moral order itself **contributes significantly** to people's rights being respected. It does so by **encouraging and reinforcing** moral behavior and by **discouraging and sanctioning** immoral behavior. In this moral community people **mutually reinforce** each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be **much more violation of people's rights**. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in. Certain types of behavior constitute **a direct attack on the moral order**. When the violation of human rights is **flagrant**, **willful**, and **persistent**, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually **undermine altogether** the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order. An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone **flagrantly**, **willfully**, and **repeatedly** violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, **must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order**. How does shunning do this? First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces **support for the moral order** and **backs up the announcement with action**. This action **reinforces the commitment to the moral order** both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.) Further, shunning may have **a moral effect** on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by **moral suasion** what cannot be achieved by "force." Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of **moral sanction**, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of **maintaining the moral order**, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it. Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have **an obligation to shun** in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as **tacit complicity** in the **willful**, **persistent**, and **flagrant immorality**.

### 1nc – cuba ag da

**Cuba is transitioning to sustainable agriculture because the embargo- the plan reverses that**

**Gonzalez, 03 -** Professor of International Law at Seattle University. (Carmen, 2003. "Seasons of Resistance: Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in Cuba". Tulane Environmental Law Journal. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=987944)

Cuba was able to transform its agricultural development model as a consequence of the political and economic autonomy occasioned by its relative economic isolation, including its exclusion from major international financial and trade institutions.411 Paradoxically, while the U.S. embargo subjected Cuba to immense economic hardship, it also gave the Cuban government free rein to adopt agricultural policies that ran counter to the prevailing neoliberal model and that protected Cuban farmers against ruinous competition from highly subsidized agricultural producers in the United States and the European Union.412 Due to U.S.¶ pressure, Cuba was excluded from regional and international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.413 Cuba also failed to reach full membership in any regional trade association and was barred from the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).414 However, as U.S. agribusiness clamors to ease trade restrictions with Cuba, the lifting of the embargo and the end of Cuba’s economic isolation may only be a matter of time.415 It is unclear how the Cuban government will respond to the immense political and economic pressure from the United States to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that would curtail Cubansovereignty and erode protection for Cuban agriculture.416 If Cuba accedes to the dictates of agricultural trade liberalization, it appears likely that Cuba’s gains in agricultural diversification and food self-sufficiency will be **undercut by cheap, subsidized food imports from the United States** and other industrialized countries.417 Furthermore, Cuba’s experiment with organic and semi-organic agriculture may be jeopardized if the Cuban government is either unwilling or unable to restrict the sale of agrochemicals to Cuban farmers—as the Cuban government failed to restrict U.S. rice imports in the first half of the twentieth century.418 Cuba is once again at a crossroads—as it was in 1963, when the government abandoned economic diversification, renewed its emphasis on sugar production, and replaced its trade dependence on the United States with trade dependence on the socialist bloc. In the end, the future of Cuban agriculture will likely turn on a combination of external factors (such as world market prices for Cuban exports and Cuba’s future economic integration with the United States) and internal factors (such as the level of grassroots and governmental support for the alternative development model developed during the Special Period). While this Article has examined the major pieces of legislation that transformed agricultural production in Cuba, and the government’s implementation of these laws, it is important to remember that these reforms had their genesis in the economic crisis of the early 1990s and in the creative legal, and extra-legal, survival strategies developed by ordinary Cubans.419 The¶ distribution of land to thousands of small producers and the promotion of urban agriculture were in response to the self-help measures undertaken by Cuban citizens during the Special Period. As the economic crisis intensified, Cuban citizens spontaneously seized and cultivated parcels of land in state farms, along the highways, and in vacant lots, and started growing food in patios, balconies, front yards, and community gardens. Similarly, the opening of the agricultural markets was in direct response to the booming black market and its deleterious effect on the state’s food distribution system. Finally, it was the small private farmer, the neglected stepchild of the Revolution, who kept alive the traditional agroecological techniques that formed the basis of Cuba’s experiment with organic agriculture. The survival of Cuba’s alternative agricultural model will therefore depend, at least in part, on whether this model is viewed by Cuban citizens and by the Cuban leadership as a necessary adaptation to severe economic crisis or as a path-breaking achievement worthy of pride and emulation. The history of Cuban agriculture has been one of resistance and accommodation to larger economic and political forces that shaped the destiny of the island nation. Likewise, the transformation of Cuban agriculture has occurred through resistance and accommodation by Cuban workers and farmers to the hardships of the Special Period. The lifting of the U.S. economic embargo and the subjection of Cuba to the full force of economic globalization will present an enormous challenge to the retention of an agricultural development model borne of crisis and isolation. Whether Cuba will be able to resist the re-imposition of a capital-intensive, export-oriented, import-reliant agricultural model will depend on the ability of the Cuban leadership to appreciate the benefits of sustainable agriculture and to protect Cuba’s alternative agricultural model in the face of overwhelming political and economic pressure from the United States and from the global trading system.

**Cuban agriculture is key to solve the environment**

**Peters 10** (Kathryn A. Peters, J.D. from the University of Oregon . "Creating a Sustainable Urban Agriculture Revolution". University of Oregon Law School. law.uoregon.edu/org/jell/docs/251/peters.pdf)

While urban agriculture was a response to a dramatic crisis in ¶ Cuba’s history, through the development of a community-based ¶ system of cultivation on previously vacant lots employing organic ¶ farming techniques, Cuba has created a sustainable food production ¶ system.189 As of 2005, Havana was producing over ninety percent of ¶ the perishable produce consumed in its city as well as a significant ¶ portion of its milk and meat.190 With government support, the urban ¶ gardens have become a profitable economic enterprise for many ¶ Cubans.191 Local access to fresh foods has added diversity to the ¶ Cuban diet and reduced the carbon footprint associated with its food ¶ supply by reducing the transportation and chemical input required to ¶ grow and transport the food.192 The development of urban farming ¶ has also ensured **food security** for Cuba.193 The success of Cuba’s ¶ system has established the country as a model for the urban ¶ production of sustainable agriculture around the world.194¶ In transitioning to a sustainable urban agricultural system, Cuba ¶ has **drastically reduced its harmful impacts on the environment**. ¶ Cubans have been able to **significantly reduce their carbon footprints** ¶ as their food supply is no longer shipped across oceans and Cuban ¶ residents can walk to local markets for fresh produce rather than drive¶ to grocery stores.195 Reduced mechanization in food production ¶ further reduces carbon emissions. Increased urban vegetation also ¶ mitigates the impact of climate change because vegetation has a ¶ cooling effect when air temperatures are high.196 Because much of ¶ Cuba’s urban land is now vegetative, surface temperatures in Cuba ¶ may remain cooler due to the thermoregulation created by the ¶ vegetation cover.197¶ According to Dr. Nelso Camponioni Concepción, the Cuban ¶ government, through its urban agricultural program, aims “to gain the ¶ most food from every square meter of available space.”198 By ¶ utilizing available urban space for sustainable food production, Cuba ¶ is **reducing its impact on the planet’s carrying capacity**. The organic ¶ urban gardening techniques do not consume greenspace or harm the ¶ environment; therefore, measuring the true cost of externalities is not ¶ an issue. The growth of the urban gardens has created an increasing ¶ food supply and a new economy for many Cubans without negatively ¶ impacting the environment or society.

**Billions die and risks extinction**

**Cummins and Allen, 10** (Ronnie, Int’l. Dir. – Organic Consumers Association, and Will, Policy Advisor – Organic Consumers Association, “Climate Catastrophe: Surviving the 21st Century”, 2-14, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/02/14-6)

The hour is late. Leading climate scientists such as James Hansen are literally shouting at the top of their lungs that the world needs to reduce emissions by 20-40% as soon as possible, and 80-90% by the year 2050, if we are to avoid climate chaos, crop failures, endless wars, melting of the polar icecaps, and a disastrous rise in ocean levels. Either we radically reduce CO2 and carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e, which includes all GHGs, not just CO2) pollutants (currently at 390 parts per million and rising 2 ppm per year) to 350 ppm, including agriculture-derived methane and nitrous oxide pollution, or else survival for the present and future generations is in jeopardy. As scientists warned at Copenhagen, business as usual and a corresponding 7-8.6 degree Fahrenheit rise in global temperatures means that the carrying capacity of the Earth in 2100 will be reduced to one billion people. Under this hellish scenario, billions will die of thirst, cold, heat, disease, war, and starvation. If the U.S. significantly reduces greenhouse gas emissions, other countries will follow. One hopeful sign is the recent EPA announcement that it intends to regulate greenhouse gases as pollutants under the Clean Air Act. Unfortunately we are going to have to put tremendous pressure on elected public officials to force the EPA to crack down on GHG polluters (including industrial farms and food processors). Public pressure is especially critical since "just say no" Congressmen-both Democrats and Republicans-along with agribusiness, real estate developers, the construction industry, and the fossil fuel lobby appear determined to maintain "business as usual."

### 1nc – blockade

**1 No impact to disposability**

**Dickinson 04**, associate professor of history – UC Davis,

(Edward, Central European History, 37.1)

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. **But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading**, because it obfuscates the **profoundly different** strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively **quite different from totalitarianism.** Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is **functionally incompatible** with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly **narrow limits on coercive policies**, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufé cient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic coné guration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, **totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point** for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. **This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian** (and Peukertian) **theory.** Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stiè ing night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite **radically differing potentials.**91

**2 Pure ontological focus precludes politics – leads to endless questioning and inaction**

**Wolin 90 – Professor of European History**

Richard Wolin, Professor of Modern European Intellectual History at Rice, 1990, The Politics of Being, pg. 117-118

Moreover, as Harries indicates, Heidegger's theory of the state as a "work" is modeled upon his theory of the work of art. Thus, as we have seen, in Heidegger's view, both works of art and the state are examples of the "setting-to-work of truth." In essence, the state becomes a *giant work of art:* like the work of art, it partici­pates in the revelation of truth, yet on a much more grandiose and fundamental scale, since it is the *Gesamtkunstwerk* within which all the other sub-works enact their preassigned roles. However, the idea of basing political judgments on analogy with aesthetic judg­ments is an extremely tenuous proposition. Though we may readily accept and even welcome Heidegger's claim that works of art re­veal the truth or essence of beings ("The work [of art] ... is not the reproduction of some particular entity that happens to be pres­ent at any given time," observes Heidegger; "it is, on the contrary, the reproduction of the thing's *general essence*"),66we must ques­tion the attempt to transpose aesthetico-metaphysical criteria to the realm of political life proper. Is it in point of fact meaningful to speak of the "unveiling of truth" as the raison d'etre of politics in the same way one can say this of a work of art or a philosophical work? Is not politics rather a nonmetaphysical sphere of human interaction, in which the content of collective human projects, in­stitutions, and laws is articulated, discussed, and agreed upon? Is it not, moreover, in some sense dangerousto expect "metaphysical results" from politics? For is not politics instead a sphere of hu­man plurality, difference, and multiplicity; hence, a realm in which the more exacting criteria of philosophical truth must play a sub­ordinate role? And thus, would it not in fact be to place a type of totalitarian constraint on politics to expect it to deliver over truth in such pristine and unambiguous fashion? And even if Heidegger's own conception of truth (which we shall turn to shortly) is suffi­ciently tolerant and pluralistic to allay such fears, shouldn't the main category of political life be justice instead of truth? Undoubt­edly, Heidegger's long-standing prejudices against "value-philosophy” prevented him from seriously entertaining this proposition; and thus, as a category of political judgment, justice would not stand in sufficiently close proximity to Being. In all of the aforementioned instances, we see that Heidegger’s political philosophy is overburdened with ontological considerations that end up stifling the inner logic of politics as an independent sphere of human action.

**3 The reversibility of “the other” as a subject position means Levinasian ethics always devolve into a relationship of domina**t**ion in a face to face encounter**

**Hägglund**, PhD candidate in Comparative Literature at Cornell University, 200**6** (Martin, “The Necessity of Discrimination,” Project Muse)

As a result, Levinas's injunction of unconditional submission before the other cannot be sustained. Although Levinas claims to proceed from the face-to-face relation, he evidently postulates that the subject in the ethical encounter either gazes upward (toward the Other as the High) or downward (toward the Other as someone who is helplessly in need, bearing "the face of the poor, the stranger, the widow and the orphan" as a refrain declares in *Totality and Infinity*). But regarding all the situations where you are confronted with an other who assaults you, turns down the offered hospitality, and in turn denies you help when you need it, Levinas has nothing to say. If the other whom I encounter wants to kill me, should I then submit myself to his or her command? And if someone disagrees with me, should I then automatically accept this criticism as a law that is not to be questioned or counterattacked? Questions like these make it clear that Levinas does not at all found his ethics on an intersubjective encounter. Rather, he presupposes that the ethical encounter exhibits a fundamental asymmetry, where the other is an absolute Other who reveals the transcendence **[End Page 52]**of the Good. Accordingly, Levinas condemns every form of self-love as a corruption of the ethical relation, and prescribes that the subject should devote itself entirely to the other. To be ethical is for Levinas to be purely disinterested, to take responsibility for the other without seeking any recognition on one's own behalf.[19](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/diacritics/v034/34.1hagglund.html" \l "FOOT19) It suffices, however, to place yourself face-to-face with someone else to realize that the asymmetry assumed by Levinas is self-refuting. If you and I are standing in front of each other, who is the other? The answer can only be doubly affirmative since "the other" is an interchangeable term that shifts referent depending on who pronounces the words. I am an other for the other and vice versa, as Derrida reinforces in "Violence and Metaphysics." Derrida's argument not only contradicts Levinas's idea of the absolutely Other, but also undercuts his rhetoric. That "the other" is a reversible term means that all of Levinas's ethical declarations can be read against themselves. To say that the I should subject itself to the other is at the same time to say that the other should subject itself to the I, since I am a you and you are an I when we are others for each other. To condemn the self-love of the I is by the same token to condemn the self-love of the other. Indeed, whoever advocates a Levinasian ethics will be confronted with a merciless irony as soon as he or she comes up to someone else and face-to-face declares, "You should subject yourself to the Other," which then literally means, "You should subject yourself to Me, you should obey My law."

**4 Consequentiallism key to progressivism – their moralism guarantees alienating potential allies and makes progressive reform impossible**

**Isaac**, 200**2**

(Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” *Dissent*, Spring)

But what is absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who do not believe that the discourse of “anti-imperialism” speaks to their lives. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states—including most workers and the poor—value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jürgen Habermas has called “constitutional patriotism”: a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious identifications with Subcommandante Marcos or starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live. The ease with which the campus left responded to September 11 by rehearsing an alltoo- familiar narrative of American militarism and imperialism is not simply disturbing. It is a sign of this left’s alienation from the society in which it operates (the worst examples of this are statements of the Student Peace Action Coalition Network, which declare that “the United States Government is the world’s greatest terror organization,” and suggest that “homicidal psychopaths of the United States Government” engineered the World Trade Center attacks as a pretext for imperialist aggression. See http://www.gospan.org). Many left activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions of) Iraqi or Afghan civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next. This is not because of any “disloyalty.” Charges like that lack intellectual or political merit. It is because of a debilitating moralism; because it is easier to denounce wrong than to take real responsibility for correcting it, easier to locate and to oppose a remote evil than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But it exhibits little interest in how and why so many Americans think differently. The “peace” demonstrations organized across the country within a few days of the September 11 attacks—in which local Green Party activists often played a crucial role—were, whatever else they were, a sign of their organizers’ lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, they focused their energy not on the legitimate fear and outrage of American citizens but rather on the evils of the American government and its widely supported response to the terror. Hardly anyone was paying attention, but they alienated anyone who was. This was utterly predictable. And that is my point. The predictable consequences did not matter. What mattered was simply the expression of righteous indignation about what is wrong with the United States, as if September 11 hadn’t really happened. Whatever one thinks about America’s deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that a political praxis preoccupation with this is foolish and self-defeating. The other, more serious consequence of this moralizing tendency is the failure to think seriously about global *politics*. The campus left is rightly interested in the ills of global capitalism. But politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of “solidarity” with certain oppressed groups—Palestinians but not Syrians, Afghan civilians (though not those who welcome liberation from the Taliban), but not Bosnians or Kosovars or Rwandans—and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. The economic discourse of the campus left is a universalist discourse of human needs and workers rights; but it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. This refusal is linked to a peculiar strain of pacifism, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism.

### 1nc – hospitality

**1 Unconditional hospitality is bad – puts the host in a constant state of guilt, leads to paralysis since no actions can truly be “ethical,” it causes immense suffering and prevents obligation towards particular individuals.**

Gerasimos **Kakoliris**, 1-20-20**09**, School of Humanities, The Hellenic Open University, Patras, Greece, “Jaques Derrida on Unconditional and Conditional Hospitality,” http://books.google.com/books?id=\_42Oiy7nn80C&pg=PA68&lpg=PA68&dq=unconditional+hospitality+unethical&source=bl&ots=JLCIczBd3u&sig=Iui9VNVHL\_1xV-PnjzYBXERPSRA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=DKDtUbGLHeHhygGt4YHYAQ&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=unconditional%20hospitality%20unethical&f=false

The accession to this “hyperbolic” ethics of hospitality places us in a permanent situation of “had conscience.” or “guilt”. The “absolute” or “hyperbolic” law of hospitality precludes someone from ever being hospitable enough. Therefore, one is always guilty and he or she must always ask for forgiveness for never welcoming the other enough. Moreover, one should feel also guilty and, therefore, ask forgiveness for the fact that the hospitality he or she offers can be transformed into a weapon, a confirmation of his or her sovereignty, or even omnipotence, or an appeal for recognition since “one always takes by giving.” One must, therefore, a priori, ask forgiveness for the gift of hospitality itself, for the sovereignty or the desire of sovereignty of the gift of hospitality.d As Derrida declares: “So you cannot prevent me from having a had conscience, and that is the main motivation of my ethics and my poIitics.c It seems that, since such an ethics is “hyperbolic”, it prohibits any decision from being absolutely ethical. This prohibition is, in a certain sense, the **dissolution of the possibility of ethical decision.** For, how one can reconcile the fact that while, for Derrida. hospitality is given to the irreducible, singular entity, simultaneously, unconditional hospitality, as universal law, obliges hospitality to he given to anyone indiscriminately. Because, as Derrida himself recognizes, “as soon as I relate to an irreducible singular one, I am **betraying another one**, or I introduce a **third** one who disturbs or corrupts the singular relation to the other.” Hence, the more “absolute” or “hyperbolic” the ethics of hospitality becomes the **more** **unethical** it becomes. By demanding the unconditional welcome of the stranger, beyond the possibility of any discrimination, pure or absolute hospitality can lead not only to the destruction of one’s home, but also to the **suffering** or even the **death** of the host, since the person who enters can be a murderer. Consequently, if hospitality ought to be given, according to the law of unconditional hospitality, to anyone indiscriminately, then it seems legitimate for someone to think, when he or she engages in the experience of decision-making. that “no one has more weight than anybody else.” As Derrida poses it in The Gift of Death.8 why should I look after this particular cat and not the other cats? Yet. do we not usually experience the sense that — even if we can agree that there are lots of situations where we can never be absolutely sure of this — somebody has some sort of prio**r claim**? Hence, to place at the centre of the experience of decision-making the idea that hospitality is an absolutely general obligation to everybody is to render **any notion** of special obligation towards persons who are in urgent need of it rather **problematic**. For, the unconditional law excludes the possibility of any kind of discrimination between individuals.

**2 Universal hospitality kills ethics and morals – renders decision-making impossible.**

Richard **Kearney**, 1-01-20**01**, Charles Seelig professor of philosophy at Boston College, author of over 20 books on European philosophy and literature, “Others and Aliens; Between Good and Evil,” from “Evil After Postmodernism; Histories, Narratives, and Ethics,” https://www2.bc.edu/~kearneyr/pdf\_articles/pl86217.pdf

The difficulty with this analysis of hospitality is that it seems to preclude our need to differentiate between good and evil aliens, between benign and malign strangers, between saints and psychopaths (though admittedly 99 per cent of us fall somewhere between the two). If hospitality is to remain absolutely just and true, all incoming others must remain unidentifiable and undecidable. Derrida appears to claim as much when he declares that for pure hospitality or pure gift to occur there must be absolute surprise . . . an opening without horizon of expectation . . . to the newcomer whoever that may be. The newcomer may be good or evil, but if you exclude the possibility that the newcomer is coming to destroy your house, if you want to control this and exclude this terrible possibility in advance, there is no hospitality. . . . The other, Like the Messiah, must arrive whenever he or she wants.10 For Derrida, aliens only come in the dark (like thieves in the night), and we are always in the dark when they come. We are never sure who or what they are; we cannot even be sure if we are hallucinating or not. For the absolute other is without name and without face, an “impossible, unimaginable. unforseeable, unbelievable, absolute surprise.” The best we can do is try to read between the lines and make a **leap of faith**, an impossible leap of faith, like Abraham, like Kierkegaard. But why not add — and here’s my difficulty with thc undecidable — “like Jim Jones or David Koresh” or other figures of mystical madness who believe they are recipients of messianic messages from some Other they call God? If all reading is reading in the dark, how can we **discern** between holy and unholy spirits, how **distinguish** between the deities of peace and justice and those of horror and destruction? Joseph Campbell. for one, has much to say about messianic monsters in The Power of Myth. a cautionary reminder (it seems to me) of the need for some kind of ethical decision: “By monster I mean some horrendous presence or apparition that **explodes** **all** **your** **standards** for harmony, order and ethical conduct.. . . That’s God in the role of destroyer, Such experiences go past ethical judgements. **Ethics is wiped out**.. . God is horrific.”2 To be absolutely hospitable is to **suspend all criteria** of ethical or juridical discrimination. And in such non-discriminate openness to alterity we find ourselves unable to differentiate between good and evil, which is a fine lesson in tolerance but not necessarily in moral judgement. 1f there **is** **a** **difference** between Jesus and Jim Joncs, between Saint Francis and Stalin, between Melena and Mengele. between Siddhartha and the Marquis de Sade and I think most of us would want to say there is — then some further philo sophical reflections are needed to supplement the deconstructive gesture of hospitality. Deconstructive non-judgementalism needs to be supplemented, I suggest. with a hermeneutics of practical wisdom.

**3 Unconditional hospitality is politically impossible – it inevitably totalizes the Other and denies the choice to Others who don’t want to be interacted with.**

Gilbert **Leung**1 **and** Matthew **Stone**2, 4-1-20**09**, Birkbeck, University of London1, London Metropolitan University2, “Otherwise than Hospitality: A Disputation on the Relation of Ethics to Law and Politics,” http://repository.essex.ac.uk/4465/1/Otherwise\_than\_Hospitality.pdf

Although ethically it is unconditional, one cannot say that at the political level hospitality is always the right choice, because one cannot be hospitable to all. Indeed, Levinas was acutely aware of the harsh reality of politics. In a notorious radio interview, when asked whether the Palestinian is, for the Israeli, the deserving other par excellence, he said the following: [I]f your neighbour attacks another neighbour or treats him unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity takes on another character, in alterity we can find an enemy, or at least then we are faced with the problem of knowing who is right and who is wrong, who is just and who is unjust. There are people who are wrong. (Levinas 1989, 294). Whilst at the heart of humanity is an originary ethics, a subjective welcoming of the other person, this does not negate the necessity of politics in all its coldness and brutality. The issue, then, at the core of this critique, is Derrida’s pursuance of hospitality at this political level. Does this not over-simplify the political problematic, revealing a questionable assumption that all people desire (political) hospitality, and that the latter is the most appropriate political strategy? Is there a situation in which the ethical demand requires a non-hospitable response at the level of politics? The decline of the nation state and the contemporary prevalence of ‘refugees of every kind, immigrants with or without citizenship, exiled or forced from their homes, whether with or without papers’ heighten Derrida’s interest in hospitality, and helps to justify his preoccupation (Derrida 1999, 71). But this is to characterise the other in a particular way: migratory; stateless and, crucially, seeking a home. Within the context of refugee politics, this is clearly appropriate. But against a generalisation of the category of the other, we pose an alternative exemplar: the other that does not desire hospitality. This alterity is embodied by the person who wants to resist political inclusion. Whilst such an other would necessarily still provoke the unconditional hospitality of originary ethics, it is clear that it is no longer appropriate in their case to promote hospitality at the political level. As David Gauthier has emphasised, a politics of hospitality would presume a universal fraternity, a kinship and co-belonging. And, as he notes, surely the absolute other would be beyond fraternity itself. In this case, then, there can be only two alternatives when hospitality becomes the dominant political imperative: Either one can remain outside the community, or one can seek to become assimilated into it. In the former instance, the Other remains outside the community’s warm embrace. In the latter, the Other is absorbed into the community, and its otherness is eliminated. In both cases, the Other is totalized. (Gauthier 2007, 178). In other words, the other is either given hospitality that it does not desire, and is therefore assimilated into a fraternity to which it does not belong, or it is left out, which presumably undermines hospitality as a locus for politics. In either case, hospitality reveals its own violence (and we must stress again that by violence we mean ontological violence: the failure of ethics as the reduction of absolute otherness to the language of the same, to whatever extent). The critique being made of Derrida here is perhaps one of emphasis. He was undoubtedly aware, as the last section has observed, of the inherent hostility of hospitality. But with this in mind, we ask why he championed it as a political strategy, as well as a mere descriptive account of an originary ethics. When one shifts attention away from the refugee and toward the other who does not desire inclusion, the violence of hospitality is rendered inescapably visible. And to welcome, in this scene, demonstrates a different type of violence, for the failure of hospitality is not that one is not hospitable enough but, paradoxically, that one has been hospitable at all. To welcome, and indeed to say anything, to engage the other in dialogue, is to say too much, to reduce alterity to the sameness of language. This is a violence that cannot be answered fully with the idea of forgiveness, because here forgiveness itself reveals a similar violence: the aspiration to dialogue, and a demand for interaction with an other that prefers to be left alone. Whilst we are told that it is necessary to impose limits, would Derrida go so far to say that conditional hospitality is not merely a requirement to maintain limits and order, but also offers the possibility of judging whether the other wants hospitality in the first place? Whilst he was clearly aware that the scene of forgiveness and hospitality contains its own violence and impossibility, it could be suggested that, in some cases, these are the wrong goals, even as aporias. Forgiveness seeks a bond, a touch, a linguistic recognition and, ultimately, the **redemption of the wrong-doer**. Might we suggest that in certain situations, such as the quiet provocation of the other that resists inclusion, one cannot honestly seek redemption, but must simply aspire to an impossible and guilty silence?

**4 An ethic of love for the other is bad – endorse universal indifference instead.**

Jodi **Dean**, 3-15-20**06**, teaches political theory, research and writing focus on the contemporary space and possibility of politics, edited Feminism and the New Democracy (1997), Cultural Studies and Political Theory (2000), with Paul A. Passavant, Empire's New Clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri (2004), with Jon Anderson and Geert Lovink, Reformatting Politics: Information Technology and Global Civil Society (2006), “Zizek’s critique of Levinas,” http://jdeanicite.typepad.com/i\_cite/2006/03/zizeks\_critique.html

As I read him, Zizek's critique of Levinas has 3+1 elements, that is, three criticisms and a counter. The criticisms focus on: the big Other of the Symbolic order, the implicit privileging that results from the asymmetry of the call of the Other; and the Musselman. The counter involves Zizek's view that others are an ethically indifferent multitude. Put in most general terms, the disagreements might be thought in terms of the ethics of the other. Zizek rejects this view, as he must with his basic assumptions of the subject as lack and of the symbolic other has lacking, incomplete. Any fundamental emphasis on the call of the other would involve filling in/covering over/denying the lack in the subject and hence eliminate the very space necessary for freedom. Additionally, we might say that unlike Deleuze (and Agamben?) Zizek does not equate ethics and ontology and unlike Levinas Zizek does not think of the ethical as pre-ontological/transcendental. Rather, for Zizek, ethics emerges in and as the gap within immanence, as the split or that cuts through our relations or interactions with all sorts of differentiated others. This split might be thought of as a no to these relations, as a calling into question their givenness, as a withdrawal from their everydayness. 1.**The Symbolic.** Zizek argues that Levinas ultimately anchors the symbolic order of norms in the face. Why? Because the face is that which guarantees itself. It is always already there as an ethical a priori that establishes the conditions of possibility for ethics. In Zizek's view, this grounding is **fetishistic** insofar as it covers over the lack in the symbolic, the fact that there is nothing that guarantees it and that it remains essentially non-all. Zizek does endorse one aspect of Levinas's ethics, however, the way that it is fundamentally anti-biopolitical, the way that it endorses something that is beyond mere life. 2. **Asymmetry** Zizek argues that the asymmetry in which I am always already responsible (hostage) to the Other ends up "privileging one particular group that assumes responsibility for all others, that embodies in a privileged way this responsibility." In support of this claim he cites a passage from Difficult Freedom regarding the ultimate duties of the chosen people and a moral consciousness that knows itself to be the center of the world. Yet, his argument also runs along a different course, namely, that what I'll call the hostage notion of subjectivity results in questioning one's own basic right to exist, as self-questioning that Zizek finds to be speculatively identical with self-privileging: I am the center whose existence threatens all others. Ultimately, the matter is one of privileging, whether of a group or of a singular moral consciousness. Not surprisingly, Zizek's response emphasizes the subject as lack, the subject as the hole in the order of being. 3. **The Muselmann** Zizek emphasizes that the Muselmann is one who cannot **answer** the call of the other and who cannot be seen as **addressing** us--he is **faceless**, a blank wall. He rejects the possibility that Levinasian ethics can include the Muselmann because of the way that the Muselmann is an **overlap** of innocence and evil, and hence **subverts** the sense of absolute authenticity to which the idea of the face is supposed to attest. +1 Justice is not with regard to the neighbor Zizek argues for a cold justice that chooses against the face for the third. For him, this is an uprooting of justice, one that severs the 'contingent umbilical link that renders it embedded in a situation' (and, my question here is whether this marks a disagreement with Badiou's ethics of the situation or an agreement insofar as it is indifference to difference.) More specifically, Zizek argues in this regard that grounding ethics in the relationship to the Other's face is a priori impossible, since the limitation of our capacity to relate to Others' faces is the mark of our very finitude. In other words, the limitation of our ethical relation of responsibility toward the Other's face which necessitates the rise of the Third (the domain of regulations) us a positive condition of ethics, not simply its secondary supplement. If we deny this--in other word, if we stick to the postulate of a final translatability of the Third into a relation to the Other's face--we remain caught in the vicious cycle of 'understanding.' So, what is choosing the third? It is not choosing some kind of others with positive features; it is not recognition caught in some kind of imaginary or symbolic relationship to others. Rather, it is a kind of radical indifference to others, the abstraction of the law. This indifference is also the space of love, love for one who stands out from the multitude toward whom I am indifferent. And, this indifference is preferable to something like love for all insofar love for all relies on the **logic** **of universality** and its exception: there can only be an all whom I love insofar as there is one whom I hate. (Preferable, then, is the reformulation in terms of the feminine formula of sexuation: there is nobody whom I do not love--which is connected with I do not love you all (the all remains incomplete, non-all).

**5 Applying universal hospitality to politics is silly if the Other rejects your hospitality – causes net more suffering.**

Gilbert **Leung**1 **and** Matthew **Stone**2, 4-1-20**09**, Birkbeck, University of London1, London Metropolitan University2, “Otherwise than Hospitality: A Disputation on the Relation of Ethics to Law and Politics,” http://repository.essex.ac.uk/4465/1/Otherwise\_than\_Hospitality.pdf

In this essay, we would like to consider a potential critique of Derrida’s application of an ethics of hospitality to a politics. Given that this project started as a debate between the authors at the 2007 Critical Legal Conference, it seemed appropriate that the style of the essay should follow the excitement of a dialectic that is quasi-Socratic in form. In section one, we give an overview of Derrida’s notion of hospitality and then proceed in section two to critique the ontological violence in hospitality through the positing of an other who rejects hospitality. For this other, we ask why we should pursue hospitality on a political level when it would be **far** **less** **violent** to **not** offer hospitality in the first place. The third section serves as a counter-critique or self-critique which focuses on the nature of the relation between ethics and politics and the distinction between conceiving the other as either transcendent or transimmanent. The concluding section tangentially expands on this by looking at the violence endured and the kind of hospitality proffered \* G. Leung, Birkbeck, University of London; M. Stone, London Metropolitan University.2 Law and Critique (2009) vol. 20 no. 2, 193–206. The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com in order for this essay to come before you as a joint collaboration between two authors using the first person plural and which ends with one ‘dissensual’ signature.

## 2nc

### 2nc – schmitt

#### Derridian infinite responsibility only brings about infinite hostility toward the other as one attempts to eliminate otherness as a prerequisite for identification.

Prozorov, Research Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, in ‘8

[Sergei, “De-Limitation: The Denigration of Boundaries in the Political Thought of Late Modernity” in The Geopolitics of European Identity, ed. Noel Parker, pg. 31-2]

However, it is also possible to combine denigration of boundaries with the elevation of the other to a position infinitely superior to the self. This is most strikingly exemplified by the Levinasian “postmodern” ethics of the later works of Derrida, which establishes an asymmetric relationship between the self and the other, whereby it is precisely the other who calls the self in question, and paves the way for the assumption of infinite responsibility of the self to the other, which in fact constitutes the self as an ethical subject (cf. Levinas 1969; Derrida 1992; 1996). The very borderline between self and other thus evaporates in the reconstruction of this rela- tion in terms of radical dependence. Insofar as every self is presumably someone’s other, we arrive at radical interdependence. Contrast Schmitt’s (1976) construction of self-other (friend-enemy) relations in terms of existential equality, in which both figures emerge simultaneously and do not preexist the act of their discrimination. A Derridean postmodern ethics posits the self as an effect of the encounter with the other and conditions the ethicality of the self by the assumption of infinite responsibility before the other (see Moran 2002; Sharpe 2002). This difference from Schmitt is highly illuminating in the context of de-limitation. Schmitt resisted the absolutization of the other, because for him the elimination of boundaries that divide the self and the other would bring about not absolute hospitality but absolute hostility, the desire for the elimination of the other (see Ojakangas 2004, ch. 4). This logic is far easier to grasp than the assumption of infinite responsibility of the self to something that is not merely different but, in the Derridean axiom, “wholly other”—with which one logically can have no common identity and, therefore, no possibility of empathy or, for that matter, any relation at all. It is, therefore, hardly puzzling that all empirical concretizations of post- modern ethics easily fall short. At its worst, the ethics of responsibility to “otherness” turns out just as hypocritical as liberal multiculturalism, depriving the other of its “otherness” through a kind of forced empathy: a demand for the inclusion of the other into the liberal-democratic order of tolerance that is oblivious to the fact that it is frequently the very resistance to this inclusion that constitutes the other as other. At its best, this ethics is resigned to indecision and passivity, doomed to the endless contemplation of its own momentous impossibility (see Prozorov 2005). In either case, however, we observe an elementary gesture of the effacement of boundaries between the self and the other through the postulate of their radical interdependence.

#### Derrida admits that a pursuit toward pure hospitality will, IN ALL INSTANCES, fail. The world is violent, human nature steers towards selfishness, and the consequent power structures sustaining injustices are needed to extend hospitality in the first place. Without ownership and control there cannot be the possibility of hosting anyone.

#### Foster, oxford PhD, 7

[Jason, “Hospitality: The Apostle John, Jacques Derrida, and Us” (<http://thirdmill.org/newfiles/jas_foster/jas_foster.hospitality.pdf>) T.a]

Derrida is aware that such a radical take on hospitality carries certain risks with it. He is quite frank in saying that the result of this kind of hospitality might be “terrible because the newcomer may be a good person, or may be the devil." 30 But to Derrida, it does not matter who it is. Pure hospitality is completely unconditional and has no limits whatsoever. The door is always open; the lock is always unlocked. Pure hospitality is extended and given without any prior knowledge of who we are extending it to. 31 This is what Derrida means by the "other;" receiving and embracing newcomers we truly know nothing about at all. 32 For Derrida, no question or inquiry we might make to a potential guest is virtuous because such questions are merely impure attempts to classify the person into our own predetermined categories of being. 33 The Mediterranean/Johannine idea of testing (and its modern counterpart – sizing people up) is clearly frowned upon by Derrida. Pure hospitality is the unconditional "hospitality of visitation" which introduces radical surprise into hospitality. This stands in contrast to actual hospitality's "hospitality of invitation," which makes hospitality a gated and conditional product of our own self-centered preferences, and is extended only on our own terms. 34 Derrida believes the actual hospitality of our day is violent in forcing restrictive conformity through enforcing conditions upon those to whom it is extended. In effect, Derrida believes the structure of barriers and restrictions we adopt as the masters of our space when we extend actual hospitality to others renders these "others" as strangers and refugees. 35 For Derrida, our actual hospitality rests upon behavioral conditions and prerequisites that tacitly advocate limits on the extent to which we're willing to be trespassed by our guests. This makes our hospitality inhospitable. Derrida mostly tends to blame Kant's "universal hospitality" 36 for this problem that carried with it accepted standards of conduct, and time limits on its extension. 37 Because Derrida's messianic future is indeterminate and beyond the horizon of expectation, pure hospitality, as such, is impossible to achieve and he acknowledges this. His pure hospitality is an eschatological ideal that can never be realized in a violent world. 38 Derrida sees the world as thoroughly violent, with violence interwoven into all aspects of society and impossible to avoid. Derrida believes all human hospitality is tainted by narcissism that leads to some degree of insincerity when we extend hospitality to others. When we give, we are always selfishly looking for something in return, 39 whether it be a tangible gift or an intangible feeling of selfcongratulation for being liked and appreciated by our guests. For Derrida, hospitality is always an economy of exchange, and gift-giving is never purely altruistic. 40 Thus, pure hospitality is unachievable in Derrida's vision. He longs for a messianic future that he believes will never materialize. His deconstruction of hospitality is so thorough that it leaves us nowhere, at least in my view. The very nature of actual hospitality assumes and perpetuates a structure of inequality between host and guest that of itself must be eliminated if we are to have true and pure hospitality. 41 Lest anyone think this is simply an issue between individuals, Derrida believes the ramifications are thoroughly global in nature and speak to the reality that "[h]ospitality is culture itself…ethics is hospitality; ethics is so thoroughly coextensive with the experience of hospitality." 42 But because this "power structure" is the basis for hospitality in the first place and depends on it for its very existence, it is impossible to rid ourselves of it, even though the breaking down of this structure of inequality and barriers is the goal of pure hospitality. As with the step of testing, Derrida clearly resists the well defined roles and behavioral expectations of host and guest that are intrinsic in the Mediterranean process of hospitality that is an understood reality of the Johannine corpus. Without ownership and control, there is no longer the possibility of hosting anyone under any real circumstance. The impossibility of pure hospitality is demonstrated each time we extend actual hospitality. The possible highlights the impossible, and actually increases the chasm between the two. This chasm between Derrida's pure hospitality and our actual hospitality is unconquerable, and he knows it. 44 It is little wonder then, that his interpreter, John Caputo, describes Derrida as a man of "prayer and tears." 45

#### And, reversibility means a rape victim is required to empathize with the rapist – independent reason to vote negative it causes psychological damage to the victims

Jack M. Balkin, Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment at Yale Law, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice-- Part II, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1131, 1994, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/trans02.htm

#### Derrida's ethics of Otherness has a second component: It employs a different sense of individuality and uniqueness. Under this view, justice requires one to speak in the language of the Other by trying to see things from the Other's point of view. (78) This conception of justice seems most attractive when we are the injurer or the stronger party in a relationship, or when we are in the position of a judge who is attempting to arbitrate between competing claims. For example, suppose that we are the State, the stronger party, the oppressor, or the injurer, or suppose that we are contemplating an action that might put us in such a position. It seems only just that we should try to understand how we have injured or oppressed the Other (or might be in a position to injure or oppress). We can only do this if we try to see the problem from the Other's perspective and understand her pain and her predicament in all of its uniqueness. The duty we owe to the Other is the duty to see how our actions may affect or have affected the Other; to fulfill this duty we must put away our own preconceptions and vocabulary and try to see things from her point of view. Similarly, if we are a judge in a case attempting to arbitrate between the parties, the ethics of Otherness demands that we try to understand how our decision will affect the two parties, and this will require us to see the matter from their perspective. Suppose, however, that we are not the injurer, but the victim; not the State, but the individual; not the strong, but the weak; not the oppressor, but the oppressed. Does justice require that we speak in the language of the person we believe is injuring or oppressing us? Must a rape victim attempt to understand her violation from the rapist's point of view? Does justice demand that she attempt to speak to the rapist in his own language - one which has treated her as less than human? Must a concentration camp survivor address her former captor in the language of his worldview of Aryan supremacy? We might wonder whether this is what justice really requires, especially if the injustice we complain of is precisely that the Other failed to recognize us as a person, refused to speak in our language, and declined to consider our uniqueness and authenticity.

### 2nc – case

#### Giving the Other a cookie and asking to be biffles is not a good idea when the Other is trying to murder you with an axe. Their ‘radical hospitality’ leads to fetishist disavowal of atrocities – sometimes the Other is a faceless monster and a strategy of alienation is necessary for peace.

Naida Zukić, 11-xx-2009, assistant professor in BMCC’s Department of Speech, Communications and Theater Arts, “My Neighbor’s Face and Similar Vulgarities,” http://liminalities.net/5-4/neighbor.pdf

In positioning the neighbor as the monstrous other, Žižek reads the neighbor against Lacanian structures of the Imaginary, Symbolic, and the Real. More specifically, Žižek distinguishes between Imaginary others, which are our mirror-like relationships of mutual recognition; The Symbolic Big Other, which is “the impersonal set of rules that coordinate our coexistence”, and finally, The Other qua Real, which is “the impossible Thing, the ‘inhuman partner,’ the Other with whom no symmetrical dialogue, mediated by the symbolic Order, is possible” (“Neighbors” 143). To understand the radical Otherness inscribed in the element of the neighbor it is crucial to understand how these three Lacanian dimensions are connected. For Žižek, the neighbor as the Thing means that, “beneath the neighbor as my semblant, my mirror image, there always lurks the unfathomable abyss of radical Otherness, of a monstrous Thing that cannot be gentrified”(ibid). Žižek designates the figure of the neighbor as the ultimate object of desire in its intensity and impenetrability—the neighbor that disturbs, tortures, and is always too close. Importantly, between the Imaginary Other and the Impenetrable Real Other must step in the Symbolic Other that gentrifies their chaotic dimensions: In order to render our coexistence with the Thing minimally bearable, the symbolic order qua Third, the pacifying mediator, has to intervene: the “gentrification” of the Other-Thing into a “normal human fellow” cannot occur through our direct interaction, but presupposes the third agency to which we both submit ourselves—there is no intersubjectivity (no symmetrical, shared, relation between humans) without the impersonal symbolic Order (“Neighbors” 143-4). The neighbor is fittingly given a more unsettling dimension as the impenetrable Other, the enemy whose radical ambiguity and traumatic character do not prepare the ground for a possibility of an authentic encounter. Consequently, the impossibility of such encounters brings about the alienation of social life, which is woven into the practices, rituals, and social texture of everyday life: Even if I live side by side with others, in my normal state I ignore them. I am allowed not to get too close to others. I move in a social space where I interact with others obeying certain external “mechanical” rules, without sharing their inner world (Žižek, Violence 59). “Sometimes alienation is not a problem, but a solution,” indispensable for peaceful coexistence (ibid). Brutality feels at home in Višegrad, and the ethnic cleansing of this city was an ordinary affair, writes Maass. “Bosnia makes you question basic assumptions about humanity, and one of the questions concerns torture. Why after all should there be any limit?” (51). At the beginning of the war, paramilitary Serb forces came to town, rounded up unarmed Muslim men, and loaded them into refrigerated meat trucks. An older Muslim man who was forced to push the corpses into the river managed to escape, and later gave his testimony. The Serbs took these men to the railing of the Višegrad bridge, the man confessed, forcing them to lean forward, at which point they would either slit their throats or shoot them. They threw them all into the river. ... They ordered me and a man who was even older than me to walk toward the bridge. We came across the body of an old man with a mutilated head. They ordered us to drag him toward the bridge. As we were dragging the old one, his skull was falling open and the brain came out. We dragged the body to the bridge and they ordered us to throw it into Drina. There were two more bodies on the bridge. They had their throats cut. We were ordered to throw them into the river as well. On one of the bodies, four fingers on the left hand were freshly cut off (9). This is the neighbor When confronted with neighbor-on-neighbor violence whom do I save? The neighbor? Myself? Who do I attack? If I attack, am I just another neighbor? As a journalist, Peter Maass is not supposed to get involved in the events he covers, so he stands aside and watches a man on the verge of execution because it is a prudent thing to do. Is this much different from the “Serbs who prudently kept quiet as their Bosnian neighbors were shot or packed off to prison camps?” (21). A tragically misplaced ethical conviction? Perhaps. What about brutal acts of torture about which we know but choose to ignore? The atrocious reality of the death camps, tortures, and mass executions does not reside in the immediate reality of the violence, but in Maass’s blindness to this accumulated atrocity—the fetishist disavowal (i.e., how this violent event appears to him, not the violent event itself). In an act that suspends symbolic efficiency of witnessing torture and suffering, the watcher relies on a gesture of fetishist disavowal: “I know, but I don’t want to know that I know, so I don’t know. I know it, but I refuse to fully assume the consequences of this knowledge, so that I can continue acting as if I don’t know it” (Žižek, Violence 53). This disavowal involves a violation of his spontaneous ethical proclivity, brutal repression, and self-denial. For Levinas, what would make this event ethical, is precisely Maass’s proximity to the Other, for his proximity makes him answer for his responsibility to the neighbor. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas takes into account the self-referential face of the neighbor. To encounter the face and claim that a face can “guarantee itself,” is to acknowledge the face as the nonlinguistic point of reference between the ‘big Other’ of the symbolic order and the neighbor-as-Other (202). For Žižek, however, the human face is always already caught up in the symbolic order, engaged as that which gentrifies the reality of the neighbor (“Neighbors” 146). The neighbor is therefore never revealed in the face of the Other, but in his/her defacement: “Far from displaying ‘a quality of God’s image carried with it,’ the face is the ultimate ethical lure…The neighbor is not displayed through a face; it is in his or her fundamental dimension a faceless monster” (ibid 185).

## 1nr

### 1nr – shunning

#### Solving humans right abuse isn’t necessary — voting neg bears witness.

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 20-21)

But perhaps Thompson's pragmatic argument against interfering in the affairs of other states rules out national shunning:

Respect for domestic jurisdiction causes diplomatists to question a crusading approach to human rights. Routine interference in the essential conduct of the affairs of one government (that is, in its definition of its rights and duties) by another is a recipe for disaster in political relationships. Furthermore, history offers little support for the assumption that moral intervention can even make the situation worse. Given the realities of national sovereignty, methods such as quiet diplomacy, the private offering of incentives and rewards, and sustained individual contacts are more likely to yield results. Workability is a companion principle to respect for domestic jurisdiction. Together they provide the diplomatists' main guidelines for action in human rights as in other spheres of foreign policy. (Thompson, 1980, pp. 91-92)

As a general caution against our desire to "do something" when we do not like the policies of another country, Thompson's pragmatic approach is sound. But shunning represents a special situation in which, persuasion and direct pressure having been tried and having failed, the objective is not to change behavior but to witness against it. "Workability" has been tried and has [end page 20] failed; the flagrant, persistent, and willful violation of human rights continues and must be confronted publicly.

### 1nr – cuba ag da

#### Cuban agriculture is modeled globally

Ergas 13 (Christina Ergas, department of sociology at the University of Oregan. 4/19/13. "Food Sovereignty: Sustainable Urban Agriculture in Cuba". Centre for Research on Globalization". www.globalresearch.ca/food-sovereignty-sustainable-urban-agriculture-in-cuba/5332167)

The agricultural revolution in Cuba has ignited the imaginations of people all over the world. Cuba’s model serves as a foundation for self-sufficiency, resistance to neocolonialist development projects, innovations in agroecology, alternatives to monoculture, and a more environmentally sustainable society. Instead of turning towards austerity measures and making concessions to large international powers during a severe economic downturn, Cubans reorganized food production and worked to gain food sovereignty as a means of subsistence, environmental protection, and national security.[1](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/03/01/cuban-urban-agriculture-as-a-strategy-for-food-sovereignty#en1) While these efforts may have been born of economic necessity, they are impressive as they have been developed in opposition to a corporate global food regime.

#### Try or die- sustainable agriculture checks multiple scenarios for extinction

Peters 10 (Kathryn A. Peters, J.D. from the University of Oregon . "Creating a Sustainable Urban Agriculture Revolution". University of Oregon Law School. law.uoregon.edu/org/jell/docs/251/peters.pdf)

An adequate food supply is essential for the survival of the human ¶ race. Historically, the U.S. food system has been one of abundance. ¶ However, degradation of the environment, climate change, ¶ dependence on foreign oil and food imports, urban development ¶ trends, and increased demand due to population growth and the ¶ emerging biofuel industry2¶ all threaten our food supply. In response¶ to these threats, local-food and sustainable agriculture movements ¶ have recently formed to raise awareness of the need to pursue ¶ alternatives to the current system.3¶ In 2009, the White House ¶ acknowledged the importance of changing the way we grow food by ¶ planting an organic garden on its grounds.4¶ In the wake of the ¶ economic crisis of 2008, victory gardens, which were first made ¶ popular during the World War II era, have reemerged and created ¶ additional awareness of the need to pursue food production ¶ alternatives.5¶ Victory gardens and local sustainable agriculture reduce ¶ dependency on the established food production system, but, because ¶ the U.S. population is clustered in densely populated metropolitan ¶ areas,6¶ the majority of the population currently lacks access to land on ¶ which to grow food. ¶ In the face of environmental, economic, and social equity ¶ challenges, it is imperative that the government, at federal, state, and ¶ local levels, establish policies that promote sustainable urban ¶ agriculture to ensure access to an adequate food supply produced with ¶ minimal impact on the environment. Environmental threats stemming ¶ from climate change and the depletion and degradation of natural ¶ resources will increasingly impact the planet’s food production¶ system.7¶ The current economic crisis has increased the burden on the ¶ government to provide relief in the forms of unemployment ¶ compensation8¶ and supplemental nutrition assistance.9¶ An inherent ¶ consequence of the economic crisis is a widening disparity between ¶ the rich and poor and increased social inequity between the ¶ socioeconomic classes in America. Establishing a sustainable urban ¶ agricultural system would reduce the environmental degradation that ¶ is caused by modern agricultural practices, reduce the financial strain ¶ on government resources by increasing urban productivity and ¶ enabling urbanites to grow a local food supply, and reduce ¶ socioeconomic disparities by providing less-advantaged populations ¶ in urban areas with access to an adequate supply of fresh, nutritious ¶ food.

#### Urban agriculture has drastic impacts on environmental concerns – emissions, pollution, and energy consumption

Ergas 13 (Christina Ergas, Global Research, reviewing and citing a book by Sinan Coont, the only book devoted entirely to describing Cuba’s agriculture, “Sustainable Urban Agriculture in Cuba”, April 19, 2013, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/food-sovereignty-sustainable-urban-agriculture-in-cuba/5332167>, js)

Urban agriculture and reforestation projects also constituted important gains for the environment. Shifting food production away from reliance on fossil fuels and petrochemicals is better for human health and reduces the carbon dioxide emissions associated with food production. Urban reforestation projects provide sinks for air pollution and help beautify cities. Finally, local production of food decreases food miles. It also requires both local producers and consumers. Therefore, community members get to know each other and are responsible for each other through the production and consumption of food.

#### Air pollution makes extinction inevitable

Driesen, 3 – Associate Professor, Syracuse University College of Law (David M., Fall/Spring, “Sustainable Development and Air Quality: The Need to Replace Basic Technologies with Cleaner Alternatives,” 10 Buff. Envt'l. L.J. 25, Lexis)

Air pollution can make life unsustainable by harming the ecosystem upon which all life depends and harming the health of both future and present generations. The Rio Declaration articulates six key principles that are relevant to air pollution. These principles can also be understood as goals, because they describe a state of affairs that is worth achieving. Agenda 21, in turn, states a program of action for realizing those goals. Between them, they aid understanding of sustainable development’s meaning for air quality. The first principle is that "human beings. . . are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature", because they are "at the center of concerns for sustainable development." While the Rio Declaration refers to human health, its reference to life "in harmony with nature" also reflects a concern about the natural environment. 4 Since air pollution damages both human health and the environment, air quality implicates both of these concerns. Lead, carbon monoxide, particulate, tropospheric ozone, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides have historically threatened urban air quality in the United States. This review will focus upon tropospheric ozone, particulate, and carbon monoxide, because these pollutants present the most widespread of the remaining urban air problems, and did so at the time of the earth summit. 6 Tropospheric ozone refers to ozone fairly near to the ground, as opposed to stratospheric ozone high in the atmosphere. The stratospheric ozone layer protects human health and the environment from ultraviolet radiation, and its depletion causes problems. By contrast, tropospheric ozone damages human health and the environment. 8 In the United States, the pollutants causing "urban" air quality problems also affect human health and the environment well beyond urban boundaries. Yet, the health problems these pollutants present remain most acute in urban and suburban areas. Ozone, carbon monoxide, and particulate cause very serious public health problems that have been well recognized for a long time. Ozone forms in the atmosphere from a reaction between volatile organic compounds, nitrogen oxides, and sunlight. 10 Volatile organic compounds include a large number of hazardous air pollutants. Nitrogen oxides, as discussed below, also play a role in acidifying ecosystems. Ozone damages lung tissue. It plays a role in triggering asthma attacks, sending thousands to the hospital every summer. It effects young children and people engaged in heavy exercise especially severely. Particulate pollution, or soot, consists of combinations of a wide variety of pollutants. Nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide contribute to formation of fine particulate, which is associated with the most serious health problems. 13 Studies link particulate to tens of thousands of annual premature deaths in the United States. Like ozone it contributes to respiratory illness, but it also seems to play a [\*29] role in triggering heart attacks among the elderly. The data suggest that fine particulate, which EPA did not regulate explicitly until recently, plays a major role in these problems. 16 Health researchers have associated carbon monoxide with various types of neurological symptoms, such as visual impairment, reduced work capacity, reduced manual dexterity, poor learning ability, and difficulty in performing complex tasks. The same pollution problems causing current urban health problems also contribute to long lasting ecological problems.

#### The fact that their ethics allow sacrificing a greater number of people proves they devalue life

Wasserman and Strudler, 2003

(David, research scholar at the University of Maryland’s institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, and Alan, Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Director of the Ethics Program at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, “Can a nonconsequentialist count lives?” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31.1)

We have argued that there is not yet an adequate nonconsequentialist account of the abiding conviction that it is wrong to save the lesser rather than the greater number. Such an account must not only explain the core intuition that the numbers count, but it must also plausibly accommodate, or explain why one should reject, another robust intuition about numbers: That failing to save the larger group is a greater wrong the larger the disparity in numbers; that it is a greater wrong to save one person rather than a thousand than to save one person rather than two. A consequentialist offers an easy explanation of this intuition in terms of the greater waste of lives in the former case, but the intuition is less easily explained by an account that faults the rescuer for failing to adopt a decision procedure that respects the equality of the imperiled lives. On such an account, the rescuer who chooses an inappropriate procedure, such as a coin toss or a proportional lottery, commits a single moral error. Although his erroneous choice may wrong more or fewer people, depending on the number of people in the larger group (or the total number of imperiled people), it is not obvious why that choice is worse if it wrongs more people; the coin-tossing rescuer is not like a recidivist who commits serial wrongs. Moreover, even if his choice were regarded as morally worse the greater the number of people it wronged, this would not explain the intuition that the wrongfulness of his choice depends on the *disparity* in numbers between the two sides. It is only if, per Kavka, the rescuer is seen as disregarding the lives of the "excess" members of the larger group that the wrong can be seen as greater the larger the excess. But we have argued that that account is vulnerable to the same criticism as consequentialist accounts, in treating the failure to save the greater number as tantamount to wasting or neglecting lives. It may be that a nonconsequentialist account will have to plausibly reject the intuition that links the disparity in numbers with the magnitude of the wrong if it is to overcome the stubborn appeal of consequentialism in forced choices among lives.